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Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent 
Innovation Incentives 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette* 
In four patentable-subject-matter cases in five recent Terms, the 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the judicially created prohibitions on 
patenting “abstract ideas” and “nature,” but the boundaries of these 
exceptions remain highly contested. The dominant justification for these 
limitations is utilitarian: courts create exemptions in areas where patents 
are more likely to thwart innovation than to promote it. The resulting 
debates thus focus on whether patents are needed to provide adequate 
innovation incentives in disputed fields such as software or genetic research, 
or whether private incentives such as reputational gains, first-mover 
advantages, or competitive pressures are sufficient. But because they are 
framed by patent blinders, these debates frequently overlook a significant 
fact: the absence of patents does not imply that there would be only private 
incentives. Rather, federal and state governments facilitate financial 
transfers to researchers through a host of mechanisms—including tax 
incentives, direct grants and contracts, prizes, and regulatory exclusivity—
which already provide substantial research support in the fields where 
patents are the most controversial. 
What do these nonpatent incentives mean for patentable-subject-
matter doctrine? For those who argue that patentable subject matter should 
be based on an economic cost-benefit analysis, the answer is that this 
balancing must include a much broader array of factors—which might 
militate against tasking courts with this analysis at all. But patentable-
subject-matter debates are not just about economics, and nonpatent 
incentives might help ease the tension between utilitarian and moral 
considerations. If many people find patents on certain inventions (such as 
human genes) morally objectionable, utilitarian goals can still be served by 
using other transfer mechanisms to substitute for the incentive provided by 
patents. Indeed, nonpatent incentives may be more effective than patents in 
 
* Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School. For terrific comments on this project, many thanks to 
Tun-Jen Chiang, Robert Cook-Deegan, Daniel Hemel, Mark Lemley, Jonathan Masur, Nicholson 
Price, Michael Risch, and Lea Shaver as well as participants at the UC Irvine School of Law “Meaning 
of Myriad” symposium, the 2014 IP Scholars Conference, the Ohio State Law, Finance & Governance 
Workshop, the Akron IP Scholars Forum, the BYU Law & Entrepreneurship Colloquium, and the 
Chicago IP Colloquium. 
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contested areas, where inventors who share moral objections find little 
incentive in patents, and those who do not still find the patent incentive to 
be dulled by the persistent uncertainty that has plagued patentable-subject-
matter doctrine in recent years. In short, if courts continue to enforce robust 
subject matter exceptions, they should worry less about the lack of patents 
removing all incentives for nonobvious and valuable research, and more 
about creating stable doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In four cases over five recent Terms, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
place coherent limits on what kinds of inventions can be rewarded through the 
patent system.1 This effort to elaborate the judicially created prohibitions on 
patenting “abstract ideas” or “nature”2 has been influenced by the Court’s concern 
that without patents for certain inventions, there would be no incentive for 
companies to invest in those fields. For example, at the oral argument in AMP v. 
Myriad, Justice Scalia asked: “Why would a company incur massive investment . . . 
if it cannot patent?”3 In Mayo v. Prometheus, Justice Breyer worried that 
“discovering natural laws is often a very expensive process” with “lots of 
investment to be protected.”4 And in Bilski v. Kappos, Justice Sotomayor expressed 
concern that she had “no idea what the limits of” a broad ruling that “patent law 
doesn’t cover business methods” would be “in the computer world or the 
 
1. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
2. I use “nature” as a shorthand for the Court’s unpatentable categories of “laws of nature,” 
“natural phenomena,” and “products of nature.” See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150). 
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biomedical world,” and she noted that “[a]ll of the amici were talking about how it 
will destroy industries.”5 
The Court ultimately held that most of the patent claims at issue were not 
directed to patentable subject matter in all four of its recent cases—but in so 
doing, it seemed to take comfort in the idea that no incentive was needed for 
those particular inventions. For example, Justice Kennedy thought the invention 
in Alice v. CLS Bank would be “fairly easy to program” for someone in “a second-
year college class in engineering,”6 and those favoring invalidation argued that 
many “successful software companies . . . grew strong without incentives from 
patents.”7 Similarly, the plaintiffs seeking invalidation in Myriad argued that 
“[p]atent protection at the level of the gene . . . is simply unnecessary to spur 
innovation in diagnostics,”8 and the Justices seemed reassured by the continuing 
availability of patents on other aspects of genetic research.9 But in all four cases, 
the Court explicitly reserved questions for future cases,10 leaving the boundaries of 
patentable subject matter far from settled. 
This cautiousness in setting clear boundaries makes it difficult for 
researchers and investors to act with confidence in the patent system. The Court’s 
timidity may stem from the starkness of the choice it has been offered: either there 
are patents, or innovators must rely solely on private incentives such as 
reputational gains or first-mover advantage.11 This choice is reflected not only in 
the briefing before the Court, but also in the burgeoning literature on “IP without 
IP” (intellectual production without intellectual property), which has focused 
primarily on informal norms and market incentives that promote innovation in the 
absence of IP.12 
The Justices are right to be concerned about eliminating state-supported 
financial incentives for innovation. There is often a gap between an invention’s 
 
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (No. 08-964). 
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298). 
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae Red Hat, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(No. 13-298), 2014 WL 931833, at *17. 
8. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21–22, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 
1850746, at *21–22. 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–16, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
10. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“[W]e need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the 
‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”); Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (“[W]e express no opinion about the 
application of § 101 [to altered DNA].”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012) (“We need not, and do not, now decide whether were the steps at issue here 
less conventional [they would still be unpatentable].”); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612 (“The Court . . . need 
not define further what constitutes a patentable ‘process’ . . . .”). 
11. See infra notes 30–40 and accompanying text. 
12. For some of the most prominent recent works in this area, see KAL RAUSTIALA & 
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 
(2012); and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the 
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010). For a rare example of innovation 
without IP in a more capital-intensive field, see Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual 
Property Law: The Flu Network as a Case Study in Open Science (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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public benefit and the private benefit that can be appropriated by the inventor 
through mechanisms such as first-mover advantage, and so many welfare-
enhancing research and development (R&D) projects will not be pursued absent 
state action.13 But as I have explained in earlier work with Daniel Hemel, patents 
are only one of numerous ways that the government facilitates transfers to 
innovators.14 U.S. federal and state governments also offer many billions of dollars 
of support each year through direct grants and contracts, innovation prizes, 
regulatory exclusivity, and R&D tax incentives—and no one of these mechanisms 
is strictly superior to the others.15 
This Article examines the range of incentives that the U.S. federal and state 
governments already provide in two of the most contested areas of patentable 
subject matter: (1) biomedical innovations at the molecular level that might fall 
under the “nature” exception to patentability, including the types of inventions at 
issue in Mayo and Myriad; and (2) computer-implemented software inventions that 
might be “abstract ideas,” which are impacted by the decisions in Bilski and Alice. 
For each field, I examine the full array of public incentives, analyze which 
incentives are likely to be most effective, and discuss where additional incentives 
might be needed in light of the Supreme Court’s recent curtailment of patentable 
subject matter. 
Greater recognition of the array of nonpatent innovation incentives in these 
fields could have significant payoffs for patentable-subject-matter debates. Most 
importantly, it could prevent courts from viewing cases with patent blinders—that 
is, assuming that all innovation problems must be solved through the patent 
system—and thus being misled by the concern that a lack of patents for a certain 
type of invention would remove all incentives for nonobvious and valuable 
research in that field. It could also ease the tension between utilitarian and moral 
considerations in the current patentable-subject-matter debates. If many people 
find patents on certain inventions (such as human genes) morally objectionable,16 
utilitarian goals can still be served by using other transfer mechanisms to 
substitute for the incentive provided by patents. 
Indeed, nonpatent incentives may be more effective than patents in 
 
13. The need for government intervention is often attributed to information’s similarity to a 
public good, and the related low marginal cost of reproduction. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States (Dec. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (reviewing the literature on the extent to which information is in fact a public 
good). 
14. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303 (2013). 
15. Id. at 309, 316–25. For our taxonomical purposes in Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, we 
lumped regulatory exclusivity and patents together as ex post, market set, user pays mechanisms. Id. at 
319 n.65, 379. But when focusing on the scope of patentable subject matter, it is important to tease 
these separate reward mechanisms apart. 
16. See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1858, 1860 (2014) (contending that patentable subject matter “is often about non-economic 
moral values”). 
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contested areas, where inventors who share moral objections find little incentive 
in patents, and those who don’t still find the patent incentive to be dulled by the 
persistent uncertainty that has plagued patentable-subject-matter doctrine in recent 
years. Furthermore, these contested areas are ones in which scholars have raised 
particular concerns about the patent system,17 so nonpatent incentives may be 
more effective at spurring valuable innovations in these fields. The participants 
who object most vigorously to the Supreme Court’s recent curtailment of 
patentable subject matter (such as the biotech industry18) thus may have more 
success lobbying for increased nonpatent incentives such as tax credits or 
regulatory exclusivity than for recapturing lost ground in the subject matter wars. 
While nonpatent incentives may be relevant to patent policy in general, they 
are particularly significant in the patentable-subject-matter context. Doctrines 
such as novelty and nonobviousness have a clearer theoretical grounding: they 
exist to bar patents (and their associated costs) where the patent incentive is not 
needed for innovation to occur. Similarly, the disclosure requirements help limit 
the patent reward to the inventor’s actual technical contribution. But the judicially 
created patentable-subject-matter exceptions can limit patents even where there is 
valuable, nonobvious innovation to be done—and where there is thus a clear need 
for effective nonpatent incentives. 
To be clear, my argument is not that courts must empirically study the most 
effective form of incentives for each field of technology and then grant subject-
matter exclusions for technologies where nonpatent incentives exist (or are likely 
to be supplied) and are more effective than patents. For those who think courts 
should draw patentable-subject-matter boundaries based on an explicit economic 
balancing of incentives, the implications of my analysis are that this balancing 
must look beyond patents and that subject-matter boundaries will vary as the state 
adds or removes other incentives. I am not convinced that courts are 
institutionally equipped for this detailed, context-specific analysis, although it is 
possible that they are better equipped than the various innovation-related agencies 
or Congress, even with fewer policy levers at their disposal. Rather, I think the 
complexity of the necessary analysis is a strong argument against judicial tailoring 
of subject matter exceptions based on economic balancing. 
Instead, my argument is simply that courts deciding patentable-subject-
matter cases should not allow their concerns about eliminating innovation 
incentives for certain valuable inventions to trump competing values. Courts need 
not unduly worry that a bright-line patent exception will remove incentives for 
valuable inventions because the many other existing and potential public 
innovation incentives provide a backstop. Thus, courts should feel comfortable 
 
17. See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, Examination of Myriad-Mayo Guidance Comments—International 
Bioindustry Associations, PATENT DOCS (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/
08/examination-of-myriad-mayo-guidance-comments-international-bioindustry-associations.html 
[http: //perma.cc/3QCJ-NMSY]. 
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drawing clearer subject matter boundaries based on their interpretation of the 
statute—which might be informed by economic analysis, but which may also 
involve text, precedent, moral rights, or the value of stable and predictable 
doctrine. Just because our patent system is primarily justified by economic 
utilitarianism does not mean that it cannot accommodate competing concerns, or 
that every patent doctrine is best approached from the perspective of optimizing 
the welfare effect of the particular claims at issue. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, Part I illustrates the patent-
focused internalism of the current patentable-subject-matter debates, in which the 
state’s role in offering financial incentives is typically presented as “patents or 
nothing.” Part II then discusses nonpatent financial incentives offered by the 
government in particular contested areas. Finally, Part III describes the payoffs for 
patentable-subject-matter disputes from adopting an external perspective on 
innovation law.19 One might disagree about the payoffs of this spotlight on 
nonpatent incentives, but I hope to at least convince readers that these incentives 
are important, that they have mostly been ignored in the subject matter wars, and 
that patentable-subject-matter doctrine would benefit from considering 
innovation policy without patent blinders. 
I. PATENT INTERNALISM IN PATENTABLE-SUBJECT-MATTER DEBATES 
Although § 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject matter 
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof,”20 the Supreme Court has held 
repeatedly that “this provision contains an important implicit exception.”21 This 
judicial carve-out from patentable subject matter includes “abstract ideas,” such as 
the computer-based method of using an intermediary to reduce settlement risk at 
issue in Alice,22 or the method of hedging risk in the energy market at issue in 
Bilski.23 The implicit exception also includes “nature,” such as the isolated 
genomic DNA sequences (but not cDNA sequences) in Myriad,24 and the method 
 
19. I borrow the internal-versus-external framing from Amy Kapczynski, who has called on 
IP scholars to adopt an external approach to the innovation policy choice, Amy Kapczynski, The Cost 
of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012), although 
she has not argued that this perspective might also be valuable for approaching questions internal to 
IP law. 
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
21. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). This Article takes these 
exceptions as a given, but it is worth noting that there are plausible arguments against any 
nonstatutory carve-outs, including the expansive language of the statutory text and the difficulty of 
drawing coherent and predictable boundaries around any exception. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1333–35 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., additional reflections); Michael 
Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008). 
22. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. 
23. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010). 
24. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–19. 
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of calibrating drug dosage using a natural correlation in Mayo.25 But in each of 
these four recent cases, the Court explicitly declined to provide much guidance 
beyond its specific holding.26 The boundaries of patentable subject matter thus 
remain far from settled. 
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained in recent cases, its current 
justification for this exception is utilitarian: 
[T]he concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i]s one of pre-
emption. Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are “the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.” “[M]onopolization of 
those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the 
primary object of the patent laws.27 
Many commentators agree that patentable-subject-matter doctrine is (or should 
be) based on the utilitarian question of whether patents on certain kinds of 
inventions provide a net benefit to society.28 In other words, under this approach, 
economic efficiency can be used to help define the vague categories of “nature” 
and “abstract ideas.” Patentable-subject-matter debates have thus focused on this 
empirical question, even though the lack of clear empirical data leads to “the 
instability of rules in the area.”29 
Thus, the arguments in Myriad focused heavily on the economic effect of 
including gene patents within the “nature” exception to patentability. Those in 
 
25. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
26. See cases cited supra note 10. 
27. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (citations omitted). The Court has not always focused so explicitly 
on this economic cost-benefit analysis; in earlier cases, the justification seems more deontological. 
See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“The qualities of these 
bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”). 
28. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1279, 1287 n.14 (2014) (arguing that exclusion of “knowledge-advances” from patentable 
subject matter is normatively justified because such claims “are unusually costly and that the loss of 
incentives at the margin forgoes only a small social benefit”); John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the 
Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 618 (2009) (“[T]he patentable subject matter 
doctrines are based not on a moral or ethical decision about the desirability of patents as an end in 
themselves, but on empirical estimation of the usefulness of patents in achieving other ends 
(progress).”); Mark A. Lemley et. al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1329 (2011) 
(arguing that the subject-matter exceptions are “best understood as an effort to prevent inventors 
from claiming their ideas too broadly”); Arti K. Rai, Diagnostic Patents at the Supreme Court, 18 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014) (agreeing with the “conventional frame” that “interpretation of 
patentable subject matter . . . should be guided by innovation goals”). But see Chiang, supra note 16, at 
1860 (arguing that this “surface consensus” of utilitarianism masks underlying moral concerns); Sapna 
Kumar, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Genetic Information, 65 ALA. L. REV. 625 (2014) (arguing that 
patents on bodily information such as genetic mutations can violate individual liberty interests); Adam 
Mossoff, Why History Matters in the Patentable Subject Matter Debate, 64 FLA. L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2012) 
(arguing that historically “courts treated patents liberally and expansively” because patents were seen 
“as fundamental civil rights securing property rights in inventions”). 
29. Duffy, supra note 28, at 618. 
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favor of upholding the claims at issue argued that without patents, there would be 
no financial incentive to do the kind of research that had led to the patents at 
issue, without acknowledging even the nonpatent incentives that already provide 
significant transfers to innovators, much less the possibility of additional 
incentives.30 Those in favor of invalidating the claims countered that these worries 
were unfounded because “the majority of geneticists are willing to undertake the 
research to discover genes and develop genetic tests without the possibility of a 
patent.”31 But the briefs contained little discussion of what was incentivizing those 
geneticists if not patents—or what incentives existed to validate and 
commercialize the discoveries. In other words, the innovation policy choice was 
presented to the Court from the internal perspective of patents versus no patents, 
with little analysis of the nonpatent mechanisms through which the state facilitates 
transfers to genetic researchers.32 
This debate clearly influenced the Court. At oral argument, Justices Kagan, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor worried that if genes could not be patented, there 
would no longer be incentives for companies like Myriad: 
JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Hansen, could you tell me what you think the 
incentives are for a company to do what Myriad did? . . . Why shouldn’t 
 
30. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Animal Health Inst. & Merial Ltd. in Support of 
Respondents, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
(No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1098263, at *5 (“If the statutory incentives for invention with regard to 
created genetic molecules are eradicated, innovation in that field will cease or, at the very least, be 
substantially diminished.”); Brief of the Coalition for 21st Century Med. as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1098259, at *12 (“Gene Patents Are 
Necessary To Ensure Financial Incentives To Undertake Research and Development In Emerging 
Fields.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Genentech, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1098262, at *3 (“The development of both diagnostic and therapeutic 
applications of recombinant DNA technologies is capital intensive and time consuming. Success in 
these fields could not be achieved without the protections and incentives provided by the patent 
system.”); Brief of MPEG LA, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1099167, at *7 (“[D]enial of patent protection . . . would provide an 
insufficient incentive for invention. . . .”); Brief for the Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1122811, at *19 
(“Without Strong Patent Protection, Innovation in the Area of Biotechnology Will Decline.”). 
31. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 390998, at *16; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1850746, at *21–22 (citations omitted) (“To the extent Myriad or its 
amici are arguing that the patents in this case were necessary to create an incentive to search for . . . or 
to commercialize a test for the genes, the record is clear that they were not. Other scientists, including 
those who did not want patent exclusivity, were looking equally vigorously for the genes . . . . Patent 
protection at the level of the gene (versus on actual tests, recombinant DNA, etc.) is simply 
unnecessary to spur innovation in diagnostics.”). 
32. The exception is an amicus brief from Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”), which 
noted the “growing proliferation of alternative, nonpatent mechanisms used to stimulate research and 
development,” although its discussion focused on patent-like market exclusivity mechanisms and 
proposed prize systems. Brief of Amicus Curiae Knowledge Ecology Int’l in Support of Petitioners, 
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 476050, at *10. KEI also filed a similar brief in Bilski. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Knowledge Ecology Int’l in Support of Respondent, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (No. 
08-964), 2009 WL 3199633, at *8–15. 
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we worry that Myriad or companies like it will just say . . . we’re not going 
to do this work anymore? 
MR. HANSEN: [I]n this particular case . . . [w]e know that there were 
other labs looking for the BRCA genes and they had announced that they 
would not patent . . . [and] prior to the patent actually being issued, there 
were other labs doing BRCA testing . . . . 
JUSTICE SCALIA: But you still haven’t answered her question. Why? 
Why would a company incur massive investment . . . if it cannot patent? 
MR. HANSEN: Well, taxpayers paid for much of the investment in 
Myriad’s work, but— 
JUSTICE SCALIA: You’re still not answering the question. 
MR. HANSEN: I think scientists look for things for a whole variety of 
reasons, sometimes because they’re curious about the world as a whole, 
sometimes because— 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Curiosity is your answer. 
. . . . 
MR. HANSEN: Sometimes because they want a Nobel Prize. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: I hoped you were going to say something else, 
which is that, notwithstanding that you can’t get a patent on this gene . . . 
there are still . . . things that you could get a patent on that would make 
this kind of investment worthwhile . . . But. . .I want to know what those 
things are rather than you’re just saying, you know, we’re supposed to 
leave it to scientists who want Nobel Prizes. 
. . . . 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [T]here are substantial arguments in the amicus 
brief that this investment is necessary . . . and that makes sense. To say, 
oh, well, the taxpayers will do it, don’t worry, is, I think, an insufficient 
answer. As Justice Kagan’s follow-up questions indicated, I thought you 
might say, well, there are process patents that they can have . . . . 
. . . . 
MR. HANSEN: [I]t is certainly true, as Your Honor suggests, that one of 
the incentives here is a process patent . . . . 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That’s the whole point, isn’t it? The isolation 
itself is not valuable, it’s the use you put the isolation to. . . . 
MR. HANSEN: That’s exactly correct. Thank you.33 
As this exchange indicates, even when the lawyer for the plaintiffs seeking 
invalidation attempted to mention some nonpatent incentives, such as funding 
from taxpayers (through government grants) and reputational gains, the Justices 
were uninterested. The answer they were seeking was that even if they invalidated 
some of the claims at issue, other patent claims would still be available. 
 
33. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–16, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
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The arguments about the medical diagnostic claims at issue in Mayo were in 
many ways similar to those in Myriad. Those favoring a narrow “nature” exception 
argued that patents are “absolutely necessary” for new medical innovations,34 and 
that “patent protection today provides the incentive for . . . research and 
development of other diagnostic tests.”35 And those favoring a broader “nature” 
exception argued that researchers are instead motivated by “curiosity, career 
ambitions, and desire to advance understanding of health and disease,” as well as 
“clinical need and demand,”36 with little analysis of other state-provided financial 
incentives for this research. 
This patent internalism is not limited to medical innovation cases. The 
parties opposing an expansive “abstract ideas” exception in Alice and Bilski argued 
that “[p]atents on computer-implemented inventions are crucial to investment in 
innovation”37 and that “[i]nability to patent software innovation [would] cripple[ ] 
the ability of small- and mid-size entrepreneurial software businesses to 
compete . . . .”38 And the parties favoring an expansive “abstract ideas” exception 
 
34. Brief of Genomic Health, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Mayo, 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 
5439047, at *17. 
35. Brief for Amicus Curiae Novartis Corp. Supporting Respondent, Mayo, 312 S. Ct. 1289 
(No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373697, at *21 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. 
Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n in Support of Respondent, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 
WL 5373692, at *23 (arguing that patents are “necessary to ensure that the companies investing in 
medical research are adequately compensated”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners 
Ass’n in Support of Respondent, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5317315, at *11–12 
(“Only if scientists, doctors, and investors can rely on broad access to patent protection will we 
continue to benefit from the incredible innovation in this field . . . .”); Brief for Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 
5373694, at *4–5 (“Claims like those at issue in this case, therefore, are particularly important because 
they will be the only vehicle for introducing (and incentivizing) new and pathbreaking personalized 
medicine products for the public good.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. et al. in 
Support of Neither Party, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071920, at *21 (“Absent 
patent protection, there would be little or no incentive[s] for diagnostics companies . . . .”). 
36. Brief of Amici Curiae the Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics et al. in Support of Petitioners, 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071917, at *15; see also Brief for Petitioners, Mayo, 132 
S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 3919717, at *50 n.9 (“Time and first mover-advantage often 
provide greater or more predictable returns to innovation than patenting does.”); id. at *51 (“[I]n the 
area of genetic research, ‘[t]he prospect of patent protection does’ not play a significant role in 
motivating scientists to conduct medical research.”); Brief for ARUP Labs., Inc. & Lab. Corp. of Am. 
(d/b/a/ LabCorp) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 
2011 WL 4071919, at *18 (“There is little danger that [invalidating the patents] will harm genetic or 
other biomedical research by reducing incentives for making discoveries.”); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Cato Inst. et al. in Support of Petitioners, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071914, at 
*23 (“[M]ost innovations would be developed even if patent protection were unavailable.”). 
37. Brief of Amicus Curiae IEEE-USA in Support of Neither Party, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 
CLS Banks Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 411287, at *25; see also Brief of BSA | The 
Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 
2014 WL 828032, at *8 (“[P]atent protection is a critical incentive to expenditures for software 
research and development . . . .”). 
38. Brief of Amici Curiae Entrepreneurial Software Cos. in Support of Petitioner, Bilski v. 
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 2418474, at *9; see also Brief for the Business 
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argued that many successful software companies “grew strong without incentives 
from patents. Instead, these successes arose from the dynamics of the competitive 
market place.”39 Most discussion of nonpatent incentives focused on private 
incentives such as “[f]irst-mover advantages,” “[n]etwork effects,” “personal 
satisfaction,” and “reputation,”40 not the other forms of state support for software 
innovation or new business methods.41 
In sum, the arguments before the Supreme Court in recent patentable-
subject-matter cases have tended to describe the innovation policy choice as 
patents versus purely private incentives. And while the Justices are surely aware at 
some level of the existence of other public innovation incentives, they appear to 
have viewed patentable-subject-matter cases through patent blinders. I think Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley summed up the view of many patent scholars and judges 
when they wrote at the beginning of one of their articles: “Patent law is our 
primary policy tool to promote innovation, encourage the development of new 
technologies, and increase the fund of human knowledge.”42 But as discussed in 
the following Part, the reality of government innovation policy is far richer. 
II. INNOVATION INCENTIVES BEYOND PATENTS 
Although patentable-subject-matter debates have tended to frame the choice 
of innovation laws as “patents or nothing,” patent law is only one tool in the 
state’s innovation policy toolkit. Of course, not all commentators have ignored the 
 
Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) 
(No. 08-964), 2009 WL 2418485, at *2 (“If innovation is the engine of the American economy, then 
intellectual property is its fuel. From the time of the Founding, it has been understood that . . . 
economic incentives must be provided to those who develop new inventions.”); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Defense in Support of Petitioners, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 
(No. 08-964), 2009 WL 2445760, at *13 (“Without the full and robust protections of patent law, 
ingenuity by the small inventor is diminished and the American economy suffers from a lack of 
incentives for valuable inventions.”). 
39. Brief of Amicus Curiae Red Hat, Inc., in Support of Respondents, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 931833, at *17. 
40. Brief of Amici Curiae Checkpoint Software, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, Alice, 
2014 WL 828039, at *4; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Red Hat, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Alice, 
134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 931833, at *3 n.4 (“Open source software developers often 
contribute to open source projects on a voluntary basis.”); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer 
& Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n in Support of Respondent, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 2009 WL 
3199624, at *3 (“Internet-based business models enjoy first-mover advantages that do not, as an 
economic matter, need bolstering from patent exclusivity.”); Brief of Entrepreneurial and Consumer 
Advocates Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Bilski, 2009 WL 3199630 at *18 (“[T]he 
innovation and quality required to maintain [business advantages] are based on loyalty and reputation, 
not patent incentives.”). 
41. As noted, the KEI brief is an exception. See supra note 32. A brief from Peter Menell and 
Michael Meurer mentioned “tax incentives, research contracts, [and] government grants,” but it 
contained no further discussion of these policies and stated that “[s]taying ahead of competitors is the 
most basic and most important incentive.” Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell & 
Michael J. Meurer in Support of Respondent, Bilski, 2009 WL 3199629, at *36–37. 
42. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 
(2003). 
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role of patents—the ongoing patents-versus-prizes debate dates back to at least 
the nineteenth century,43 and there have been numerous thoughtful analyses of the 
merits of different innovation policies from both lawyers and economists.44 More 
recently, a growing literature has emphasized the importance of considering patent 
policy in the context of the array of policies through which the state influences 
knowledge production.45 
The full set of such policy levers is vast, encompassing laws and legal 
institutions related to immigration, education, contracts, land use, financial 
regulation, and tort law.46 But here I focus on the laws that most directly facilitate 
monetary transfers from the public to innovators: direct R&D spending through 
grants and contracts (including spending on national laboratories), prizes, R&D 
tax incentives, regulatory exclusivity, and other forms of intellectual property. 
In theory, all of these incentives can accomplish the same goal: intellectual 
property and regulatory exclusivity transfer rewards to innovators through 
supracompetitive prices on protected products or services, and they impose as 
much of a cost on society as policies that transfer the same amount through more 
traditional taxing and spending.47 In practice, there are important differences in 
the efficacy of these different transfer mechanisms. In Beyond the Patents–Prizes 
Debate, Daniel Hemel and I developed a new framework for comparing these 
policies.48 We argued that every government transfer to spur innovation embodies 
the answers to three distinct questions: 
1. Who decides the size of the transfer: Does the government tailor the 
reward on a project-by-project basis, or does it simply establish 
technology-neutral ground rules? Grants and fixed prizes are effective 
when the government can foresee a potential invention and evaluate its 
costs and benefits. In contrast, patents (and the patent-like reward of 
regulatory exclusivity) and tax incentives leverage private information 
about potential projects.49 
 
43. See generally Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 526–27 (2001). 
44. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science 
and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347 (2000); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual 
Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam 
B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research 
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1983). 
45. See, e.g., John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case 
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, (2015); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14; Kapczynski, 
supra note 19. 
46. See KAUFFMAN TASK FORCE ON LAW, INNOVATION, AND GROWTH, RULES FOR 
GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM (2011), http://
www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2011/02/rules
forgrowth.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3PS-4G4Z]. 
47. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 371 (discussing how patents act as a “shadow 
tax”). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 327–33. 
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2. When is the reward transferred: before the R&D results are known, or 
only ex post to successful projects? Ex post rewards such as market 
exclusivity and prizes provide a strong incentive for success, but in 
some cases that incentive might be dulled because ex post rewards are 
both delayed and speculative, and innovators might be more 
responsive to a one dollar tax credit or grant today than to a one-in-ten 
chance of a ten dollar patent or prize in the future. Ex ante rewards 
may also be more efficient because the social discount rate is less than 
the private discount rate (i.e., society values ten dollars in the future 
more than the innovator does).50 
3. Who pays: all taxpayers, or only users of the resulting technology? Here, 
patents (and similar exclusivity mechanisms) look different in that they 
are generally paid for by users of the resulting technology (through 
supracompetitive prices), rather than by all taxpayers. We argue that 
whether this “user pays” feature is normatively attractive will vary with 
the technology, and that in theory, “user pays” could be incorporated 
into other reward mechanisms.51 
The third dimension—who pays—largely raises distributive concerns that are not 
the focus of this Article, although it is important to remember that any innovation 
policy could be moved to a different place along this axis.52 (Indeed, patents 
themselves are shifted away from “user pays” in the medical context due to 




50. Id. at 333–45. In contrast, optimism bias can make ex post rewards appear more cost 
effective, though it can also cause inventors to inefficiently invest in projects with negative net 
present value. And optimism bias cannot offset the combined effects of capital constraints and risk 
aversion because the private rate of return on R&D spending is greater than the rate of return on 
ordinary capital investment. Id. at 340–42. 
51. Id. at 345–52. 
52. Id. at 347. 
53. Figure 1 is closely based on id. at 333 fig.1. 
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Each dimension is a spectrum rather than a binary choice: the middle of the 
first dimension includes incentives like technology-specific tax credits and 
proposed medical prize schemes that tie rewards to both government assessments 
of health impact and market performance; along the second dimension, transfers 
can be scheduled at various times in the R&D process. 
Here, I apply our framework to the most controversial areas of patentable 
subject matter: medical biotechnology and computer-implemented inventions.54 
Many of my conclusions here are tentative, as much remains unknown about the 
effect of different incentives.55 The important point, however, is that there are 
many nonpatent incentives through which the state facilitates transfers to 
innovators in these contexts, and optimal incentives likely vary for different types 
of inventions. 
A. “Nature” and Medical Biotechnology 
The “nature” exception to patentability—newly broadened in Mayo and 
Myriad—has the potential to affect a vast range of research, but most litigation has 
involved biomedical applications at the molecular level.56 Such applications 
 
54. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[7] (2014) (describing these areas 
as the “two most controversial areas o[f] patentable subject matter”). 
55. A new congressionally mandated report from the National Academies offers suggestions 
about metrics for the impact of research on society. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NAT’L 
ACADEMIES, FURTHERING AMERICA’S RESEARCH ENTERPRISE (Richard F. Celeste et al. eds., 2014), 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18804 [http://perma.cc/7PN9-SM57]. The report 
also encourages more evaluation through randomized experimentation, id. ch. 5, at 18, an approach I 
have also advocated, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015). 
56. For example, after Mayo and Myriad, one district court struck down claims on prenatal 
testing methods because they only added “conventional techniques of DNA detection” to the 
unpatentable natural phenomenon of paternally inherited fetal DNA circulating freely in the blood of 
a pregnant woman. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI, 2013 WL 
5863022, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013). Another district court concluded that there were 
“substantial questions” about whether any of Myriad’s remaining BRCA-related claims were directed 
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typically stem from basic research on likely unpatentable “laws of nature,”57 such 
as the connection between gene variants and diseases58 or novel approaches for 
inhibiting disease effects.59 The resulting commercial applications include not only 
diagnostic methods and genetic tests like those at issue in Mayo and Myriad, which 
currently have minimal regulatory barriers,60 but also products requiring clinical 
trials. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates trials for both small 
molecule drugs and more complex “biologics,”61 and many new therapeutics in 
both categories are natural products or are derived from them.62 These natural 
compounds may not be patentable subject matter under the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office’s (PTO) post-Myriad guidelines for examiners63 (although 
 
to patentable subject matter. In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 
F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1219 (D. Utah 2014). And a court rejected a 12(b)(6) challenge to claims directed to 
the natural law of “correlations between genomic variation in non-coding and coding regions of 
DNA” because there was insufficient evidence (at least so far) that claimed method of amplifying and 
analyzing the DNA to look for these correlations lacked sufficient “inventive concept” to be 
patentable. Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., No. CV 12-01616, 2014 WL 941354, at *3, *8 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014). 
57. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012) 
(stating that “relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the 
likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm” are unpatentable 
“laws of nature”). 
58. E.g., Scott Smemo et al., Obesity-Associated Variants Within FTO Form Long-Range Functional 
Connections with IRX3, 507 NATURE 371 (2014) (showing that obesity-linked variations in introns of 
the FTO gene alter the expression of not FTO (as previously thought) but rather a different protein, 
IRX3). This research was funded by the NIH and overseas counterparts. Id. at 375. 
59. E.g., Hyung Jin Ahn et al., A Novel A-Fibrinogen Interaction Inhibitor Rescues Altered 
Thrombosis and Cognitive Decline in Alzheimer’s Disease Mice, 211 J. EXPERIMENTAL MED. 1049 (2014) 
(showing that a small molecule (RU-505) that inhibits interactions between the Alzheimer’s-linked 
peptide amyloid-β (Aβ) and the blood-clotting protein fibrinogen can improve Alzheimer’s disease in 
mice). This work was funded by grants from the NIH and various foundations. Id. at 1061. 
60. For an overview of the FDA regulatory process for in vitro diagnostics, see Overview of 
IVD Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/ucm123682.htm [http://perma.cc/9XT4-
S3Y9] (last updated Mar. 19, 2015). The FDA is planning to regulate certain diagnostic tests more 
extensively. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Steps to Help Ensure the 
Reliability of Certain Diagnostic Tests ( July 31, 2014), www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm407321.htm [http://perma.cc/KC8E-ZSHB]. 
 It is unclear whether any diagnostic tests remain patentable. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating patents on diagnostic tests based on cell-
free fetal DNA as not patentable subject matter); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015). 
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (small molecule drugs); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (biologics). 
62. See David J. Newman & Gordon M. Cragg, Natural Products as Sources of New Drugs over the 
30 Years from 1981 to 2010, 75 J. NAT. PRODUCTS 311, 312 fig.1 (2012) (reporting that of the 1355 
therapeutics approved by the FDA between 1981 to 2010, 15% were biological (usually a large 
peptide or peptide or protein), 4% were unmodified natural products, 22% were derived from a 
natural product, and 6% were vaccines (usually made from natural products)). 
63. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/2014-interim-guidance-
subject-matter-eligibility-0 [https://perma.cc/5FAY-6Y9N] (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
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method of treatment claims are allowed, and most drugs are in fact protected by 
more than one patent64). 
Even though the “nature” exception may preclude patents on both basic and 
applied research results, many other public innovation incentives are available in 
this area. As discussed below, these incentives include (1) patent-like tools such as 
regulatory exclusivity and other forms of IP protection; (2) direct spending 
through grants and national labs; (3) R&D tax incentives; and, though not yet 
widely used, (4) prizes. 
1. Patent-like Incentives  
Patents are not the only ex post, market-set, user-pays reward for new 
biomedical innovations. As Nicholson Price has explained, pharmaceutical firms 
rely most heavily on trade secrecy protection for manufacturing innovations.65 
Additionally, trademarks enable firms to charge supracompetitive prices even after 
their patents have expired.66 (Of course, an absence of patent protection likely 
would make it more difficult for a brand to establish itself in the market, but first-
mover advantage or a period of regulatory exclusivity, as discussed below, may 
accomplish the same goal.) 
Congress has also created a separate system of regulatory exclusivity for 
many products requiring FDA approval before marketing. The Hatch-Waxman 
Act provides five years of exclusivity for any drug with a new active ingredient67 
and three years for other drugs that require new clinical trials,68 the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act provides twelve years of exclusivity for new 
biologics,69 and the Orphan Drug Act provides seven years of exclusivity for new 
drugs that treat rare diseases.70 An additional six months of exclusivity is available 
for drugs or biologics that undergo certain pediatric studies.71 These exclusivity 
periods are typically shorter than those provided by patents: the effective market 
 
64. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? Follow-on 
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 314–15 & 
fig.2 (2010) (showing that sixty-seven percent of the 938 drugs approved by the FDA from 1988 to 
2005 are protected by more than one patent). 
65. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419 (2015); W. 
Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 491 (2014) [hereinafter, Price, Making Do in Making Drugs]. 
66. See Dipak C. Jain & James G. Conley, Patent Expiry and Pharmaceutical Market Opportunities at 
the Nexus of Pricing and Innovation Policy, in INNOVATION AND MARKETING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 255 (Min Ding et al. eds., 2014). 
67. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). 
68. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv), (j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A). 
70. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc. Whereas the “data exclusivity” periods under Hatch-Waxman and the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act simply prevent a generic company from relying on 
clinical trial data from a brand-name drug, the Orphan Drug Act exclusivity period precludes any 
company from obtaining approval for the same therapeutic (small-molecule drug or biologic). 
71. Id. § 355a; 42 U.S.C. § 262(m)(3). 
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life of brand-name drugs (i.e., the period before generic entry) is twelve years.72 As 
Ben Roin has explained, “there is compelling evidence that the current periods of 
FDA-administered exclusivity are inadequate because pharmaceutical companies 
continue to screen drugs with weak patent protection out of their pipelines.”73 But 
there are numerous proposals for relying more heavily on regulatory exclusivity 
for pharmaceutical innovations.74 
Determining the current value of these patent-like incentives is hard: 
separating the value of patents from the value of the underlying technology is 
difficult, and separating the value of patent-like incentives from patents 
themselves is even more challenging. One study estimated worldwide patent rents 
earned in 1999 by U.S. public firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries 
to be $15.2 billion in 1992 dollars ($25.8 billion today).75 Another study looked at 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns and found that pharmaceutical firms 
reported $20 billion in IP-related royalties in 2002 ($27 billion today), which also 
includes foreign income.76 
2. Direct Spending  
Perhaps the largest source of state support for biomedical research is direct 
public investment through grants and national labs, including in research 
infrastructure. As Robert Cook-Deegan notes, “[b]iotechnology companies were 
founded to exploit a technological base that grew from substantial and sustained 
public investment” over the twentieth century, particularly from the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), which “grew into the world’s largest funder of 
biomedical research.”77 Today, the NIH has a budget of approximately $30 billion, 
of which over eighty percent is used to fund almost 50,000 competitive grants to 
more than 300,000 researchers, and about ten percent is used to support nearly 
6000 scientists in the NIH’s own laboratories.78 
U.S. state governments also provide direct R&D support, albeit at more 
modest levels: total state spending on health-related R&D was about $314 million 
 
72. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market 
Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012). 
73. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 
566–67 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
74. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 65, at 555–58; 
Roin, supra note 73, at 564–68. 
75. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 114 (2008). 
76. Carol A. Robbins, Measuring Payments for the Supply and the Use of Intellectual Property, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND INTANGIBLES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 139, 
159 tbl.4.8 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew Slaughter eds., 2009). 
77. Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, National Policies Influencing Innovation Based on Human Genetics, 
in THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 13, 
15, 17 (Timothy A. Caulfield & Bryn Williams-Jones eds., 1999). 
78. Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm [http://
perma.cc/F5GX-53A3] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
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in fiscal year 2011.79 Additional direct support for basic research comes from 
public-spirited nonprofit institutions, including universities and private 
foundations (such as the Gates Foundation and the Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute).80 In fiscal year 2011, U.S. universities spent $3.2 billion of institutional 
funds on R&D in the medical sciences and another $1.9 billion in the biological 
sciences,81 and the largest U.S. foundations distributed about $1.6 billion in health-
related research grants.82 
3. Tax Incentives  
R&D tax incentives are another significant source of support for biomedical 
research. The largest general R&D incentives in the current federal Tax Code are 
section 174, which allows companies to deduct research expenses immediately 
rather than over a period of future years, and section 41, which provides a tax 
credit for companies that increase their R&D spending.83 Together, these 
provisions are estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers $11 billion in 2014 for all 
technologies,84 with the portion going to pharmaceutical R&D likely around $2 
billion.85 
 
79. NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATS., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SURVEY OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FYS 2010 AND 2011, at 17 tbl.8 (2014), http://
www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf14311/pdf/nsf14311.pdf [http://perma.cc/YN52-2YTZ]. 
80. Although this support does not represent a direct transfer from taxpayers to researchers, 
these nonprofits supplement state provision of public goods and can serve as models or tests of how 
governments might most effectively use tax revenues to spur innovation. 
81. Ronda Britt, Universities Report Highest-Ever R&D Spending of $65 Billion in FY 2011, 
INFOBRIEF (Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. & Eng’g Statistics, Nat’l Sci. Foundation, Arlington, VA), Nov. 2012, 
at 3 tbl.2, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13305/nsf13305.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EE3-
8PB7]. 
82. Aggregate Fiscal Data of Grants from FC 1000 Foundations, for Health, 2011, FOUND. CTR., 
http://data.foundationcenter.org/#/fc1000/subject:health/all/total/list/2011 [http://perma.cc/
FNL3-F4HV] (last updated Oct. 2014). For a list of non-NIH funding opportunities, primarily from 
private foundations, see Finding Foundations and Other Funding Sources, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://
www.niaid.nih.gov/researchfunding/ann/pages/found.aspx [http://perma.cc/45E7-XQWV] (last 
updated Nov. 6, 2015). 
83. I.R.C. §§ 41, 174 (2012). For IRS guidance about these provisions, see Pharmaceutical 
Industry Research Credit Audit Guidelines – Revised – 4/30/04, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Pharmaceutical-Industry-Research-Credit-Audit-Guidelines---Revised---4-30-04 [http://
perma.cc/9BHK-5M8K] (last updated Jan. 14, 2015). 
84. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 30 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2013), http://
www.taxpayer.net/images/uploads/JCT%20Tax%20Expenditure%20report%202013.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6XCM-U3DK]. 
85. In 2005, the pharmaceutical industry claimed $915 million under section 174, or fourteen 
percent of the amount claimed under this provision by all industries. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE 
AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2010, app. tbl.4-25 (2010), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
seind10/append/c4/at04-25.pdf [http://perma.cc/GEM7-JQ5G]. And in 2011, pharmaceutical 
firms spent $41 billion on R&D, which is seventeen percent of all industrial R&D spending. 
Raymond M. Wolfe, Business R&D Performance in the United States Increased in 2011, INFOBRIEF (Nat’l 
Ctr. for Sci. & Eng’g Statistics, Nat’l Sci. Foundation, Arlington, VA), Sept. 2013, at 2 tbl.2, http://
www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13335/nsf13335.pdf [http://perma.cc/PD44-BJ9V]. It thus 
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In addition to these technology-neutral incentives, pharmaceutical firms can 
also claim the federal tax credit for fifty percent of the cost of clinical trials for 
rare diseases,86 through which they receive about $800 million a year,87 and the 
qualifying therapeutic discovery project credit,88 through which they receive about 
$200 million per year.89 And firms can also take advantage of R&D tax incentives 
at the state level;90 for example, pharmaceutical firms received $57 million in 2001 
($77 million today) through California’s R&D tax credit.91 
4. Prizes 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century governments often used technology 
inducement prizes such as the British Longitude Prize.92 After a 1999 National 
Academies report urged the U.S. government to make greater use of such prizes,93 
Congress and the President have encouraged agencies to use their budgets for this 
purpose.94 The NIH has been slow to use this authority,95 although it has offered 
small prizes for novel biomedical designs from undergraduates,96 and it recently 
announced a staged $100,000 prize for better methods of single-cell analysis.97 
Other agencies use prizes more often; for example, the Defense Advanced 
 
seems plausible that roughly fifteen percent of total R&D tax expenditures go toward the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
86. I.R.C. § 45C (2012). 
87. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 39 tbl.1. 
88. I.R.C. § 48D. This provision falls more toward the “government-set” side of the spectrum 
than most other tax incentives because the Department of Health and Human Services reviews 
applications, and the credit was initially limited to $5 million per applicant. 
89. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 30 tbl.1. 
90. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 325 & n.112. 
91. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, AN OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT TAX CREDIT (2003), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2003/randd_credit/113003_research_
development.html [http://perma.cc/HDG4-G3PT]. 
92. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 32–34, 43–44 (2004). 
93. NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT PRIZES 
IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE (1999). 
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 3719 (2012); NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR 
AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 12 (2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/InnovationStrategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4YCJ-F73W] (“President Obama called on all agencies to increase their use of prizes . . . . In the 
months to come, the Obama Administration will work closely with key agencies to leverage the new 
authority for ambitious prizes . . . .”). 
95. Michael Price, Will NIH Embrace Biomedical Research Prizes?, SCI. INSIDER ( July 19, 2011, 
4:53 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/health/2011/07/will-nih-embrace-biomedical-research-
prizes [http://perma.cc/YYR9-FBFC] (“NIH has so far sat on the sidelines of the prize game . . . .”). 
96. See Design by Biomedical Undergraduate Teams (DEBUT) Challenge, NAT’L INST. BIOMEDICAL 
IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, http://www.nibib.nih.gov/training-careers/undergraduate-
graduate/design-biomedical-undergraduate-teams-debut-challenge [http://perma.cc/GLB3-9BDL] 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
97. NIH Single Cell Analysis Challenge: Follow That Cell, INNOCENTIVE (Aug. 15, 2014), https://
www.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9933618 [http://perma.cc/G36A-73HU]. 
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Research Project Agency (DARPA) recently announced a $150,000 prize for 
infectious disease forecasting.98 
Prizes from foundations and private firms for new biomedical innovations 
are somewhat more common; for example, the Caring for Carcinoid Foundation 
is offering $300,000 for new cell lines derived from certain tumors,99 and the 
biopharmaceutical company AstraZeneca is offering $100,000 for an improved 
method of delivering short DNA molecules to designated cells.100 There are also 
many privately offered recognition prizes like the Nobel Prize in Medicine.101 The 
success of these private efforts may help the NIH determine whether and how to 
incorporate prizes into its offerings. 
In sum, there are already many nonpatent incentives for biomedical research 
at the molecular level, and there are a number of opportunities for the 
government to increase the transfers to innovators through these incentives. But if 
a policymaker wants to increase incentives for biomedical work, which incentives 
are most effective? As discussed below, the answer will depend somewhat on 
whether one is considering basic or applied biomedical work (though the 
innovation process does not always involve a clear distinction or a linear 
progression between the two102). 
Basic biomedical research is often capital intensive and prone to failure, 
which may decrease the effectiveness of ex post rewards such as prizes and 
patents.103 And when basic research does lead to significant results, these are often 
unexpected and serendipitous, making it difficult to target such work toward a 
particular market need. For example, many NIH grants lead to publications or 
drugs in different areas than intended,104 and one study found that long-term 
grants that tolerated early failure and provided great freedom to experiment led to 
many more high-impact publications than grants with predefined deliverables.105 
 
98. See Rachel Sachs, DARPA Announces Disease Forecasting Prize, BILL HEALTH (Aug. 19, 
2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2014/08/19/darpa-announces-disease-forecasting-
prize/ [http://perma.cc/EM4F-J95V]. 
99. Intestinal Carcinoid and Pancreatic Neuroendocrine Tumor Cell Lines Needed, INNOCENTIVE (Apr. 
2, 2014), https://www.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9933510 [http://perma.cc/AXT9-EE5E]. 
100. AstraZeneca Challenge: Targeted Delivery of Oligonucleotides, INNOCENTIVE (Apr. 4, 2014), 
https://www.innocentive.com/ar/challenge/9933013 [http://perma.cc/XR42-PJ76]. 
101. See, e.g., About the Wiley Foundation, WILEY FOUND., http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/
Section/id-390059.html [http://perma.cc/F597-SPZH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015); The Lurie Prize in 
the Biomedical Sciences, FOUND. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.fnih.org/what-we-do/current-
lectures-awards-and-events/lurie-prize [http://perma.cc/PNE8-EYR8] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
102. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., INNOVATION AND 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 31–60 (1995) (describing models of the 
innovative process). 
103. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 333–45. 
104. See Bhaven N. Sampat, Serendipity ( Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2545515 (showing that many NIH grants lead to publications or drugs in different 
areas than intended). 
105. Pierre Azoulay et al., Incentives and Creativity: Evidence from the Academic Life Sciences, 42 
RAND J. ECON. 527 (2011). 
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Based on the framework above, one might thus expect ex ante, government-set 
transfers to be the most effective tool for producing basic biomedical research. 
And perhaps unsurprisingly, as noted above, this is what we already observe in 
practice. 
As a prominent example, a breakthrough that led to the biotech revolution 
was the 1973 development of recombinant DNA technology by Stanley Cohen at 
Stanford and Herbert Boyer at University of California, San Francisco, supported 
by both the NIH and the National Science Foundation (NSF).106 Stanford later 
patented their inventions,107 although both Cohen and Boyer were surprised by 
the idea, and Cohen initially renounced his share of the royalties.108 These patents 
did have the benefit of bringing in $255 million in licensing fees for Stanford,109 
although the patent system is far less efficient than direct taxing and spending at 
generating revenue for universities.110 
The other innovation policy tools discussed above are more effective for 
research projects when the commercial application is less remote and speculative. 
Because many biomedical inventions can be cheaply imitated,111 firms will have 
little incentive to commercialize inventions unless they have some way to recoup 
the cost of this commercialization. 
For therapeutics requiring clinical trials to obtain FDA approval, the 
commercialization cost is quite high.112 If Myriad’s curtailment of patentable 
 
106. Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973). 
107. See U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979); U.S. Patent No. 4,468,464 (filed Nov. 
9, 1978); U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470 (filed Apr. 20, 1984). 
108. See Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology 
and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 1974–1980, 92 ISIS 541, 548–51 (2001). 
109. Kirsten Leute, Patenting and Licensing of University-Based Genetic Inventions—A View from 
Experience at Stanford University’s Office of Technology Licensing, 8 COMMUNITY GENETICS 217, 221 (2005). 
110. Indeed, many university technology transfer offices do not turn a profit. See Brian J. 
Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and 
Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285 (2014) (reviewing this literature); see also Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the Green Patent Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 
119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1731 (2010) (explaining that the most compelling justification for university 
patents is for those inventions that would not be commercialized without an exclusive right). 
111. Although biologics are much more difficult to imitate than small-molecule drugs, “the 
technology for reverse engineering complex biological compounds is advancing rapidly.” Benjamin N. 
Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 
733 (2014) (citing Steven A. Berkowitz et al., Analytical Tools for Characterizing Biopharmaceuticals and the 
Implications for Biosimilars, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 527, 527 (2012); and Savanna Steele 
et al., Better Development of Biosimilars, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. ( June 11, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://
www.dddmag.com/articles/2013/06/better-development-biosimilars [http://perma.cc/5FHR-BVL5] 
(“[T]echniques for characterizing the structural composition of biologic agents are advancing rapidly 
with the molecular structural characterization of these agents anticipated to approach 100% in the 
next five to 10 years.”)). 
112. The pharmaceutical industry group, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA), claimed that the R&D cost per new drug was $1.3 billion in 2005, although this 
industry-funded research has been highly contested. See generally Ouellette, supra note 64, at 302 
(reviewing this literature). F.M. Scherer reviewed these critiques and concluded from his own “broad-
brush” estimation that the industry-funded estimates “are both credible and perhaps even 
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subject matter in fact restricts firms’ ability to obtain meaningful patent protection 
for new “natural” therapeutics,113 it will likely deter firms from pursuing these 
products.114 Congress may thus need to address insufficient incentives for the 
development of new therapeutics. Congress has already increased rewards for a 
subset of pharmaceuticals through the Orphan Drug Act,115 and its combination 
of grants, regulatory exclusivity, and tax credits appears to be quite effective.116 
(Ironically, those supporting expansive patentable subject matter rules have cited 
the Orphan Drug Act as evidence of the success of patents.117) An alternative 
reward system might also be more effective than patents: many commentators 
argue that the current patent-based system provides insufficient incentives for 
investment in the most promising, cost-effective treatments, such as new uses of 
existing medicines or methods to reduce infections through hand washing that are 
not easily excludable.118 There are many proposals for nonpatent rewards for 
biotech and pharmaceutical companies based on the health impact of the new 
drugs they develop,119 and these proposals might gain more traction if the need 
for congressional intervention becomes apparent. 
For genetic diagnostics with fewer regulatory hurdles such as those at issue 
in Myriad, the commercialization cost has been significantly lower. Patents thus 
have been less important for this step, especially in light of the tax incentives that 
are already available. Indeed, a review of genetic tests for ten conditions—
 
conservative.” F.M. Scherer, R&D Costs and Productivity in Biopharmaceuticals (Regulatory Policy 
Program Working Paper RPP-2011-10, 2011), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/rpp/
Working%20papers/RPP_2011_10_Scherer.pdf [http://perma.cc/RJ5F-CLR6]. 
113. Although patents on the products themselves may be unavailable, see Newman & Cragg, 
supra note 62, at 312, firms can still obtain method-of-treatment patents. 
114. See Roin, supra note 73, at 566–67. 
115. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
116. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 379–80 (reviewing studies). 
117. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1326 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(Newman, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“No substitute has been devised for the 
incentive of profit opportunity through market exclusivity . . . . Illustration is seen in the Orphan 
Drug Act. . .”); Brief for Amicus Curiae Lynch Syndrome Int’l in Support of Respondents, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 
1099162, at *14 (“Absent patent protection. . .new [genetic diagnostic] assays [for small markets] ‘will 
likely go the way of treatments and medicines for orphan diseases prior to the 1983 Orphan Drug 
Act.’”). 
118. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 717 (2005); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of 
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); Roin, supra note 73; see also Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & 
Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2044 (2015) (estimating $89 billion per year in life-years lost to U.S. cancer patients due 
to the distortion caused by a fixed patent term, which biases R&D toward quick-acting cancers that 
can have shorter clinical trials). 
119. See, e.g., Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act, S. 1138, 112th Cong. (2011); Medical Innovation 
Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. (2011); AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, INCENTIVES FOR 
GLOBAL HEALTH, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 
(2008); Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 15 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 305 (2012). 
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including the breast cancer genes at issue in Myriad—found that “[i]n none of the 
case studies was the test developed by the exclusive rights holder the first to 
market.”120 This result suggests that exclusivity may not be necessary for 
commercialization of genetic tests, though it of course may spur discovery of the 
genetic correlation in the first place. 
However, the FDA is taking steps to regulate diagnostic tests more 
heavily.121 And other work suggests that the line between therapeutics and 
diagnostics is blurring, and that both require a significant government incentive.122 
But if it becomes evident post-Myriad that the expanded “nature” exception to 
patentability is leading to undercommercialization of genetic diagnostics, then 
additional nonpatent incentives could be added to this problem as well. 
To be sure, it may be politically challenging to replace lost patent incentives 
with incentives that are reflected in government budgets because, as noted above, 
the costs of patents is hidden in the “shadow tax” of supracompetitive prices on 
patented products.123 This apparent advantage of patents to taxpayers and 
politicians is illusory, and an important goal of innovation policy reform should be 
to increase the political salience of the patent system’s costs. But the political 
hurdles should not be overstated. As discussed above, researchers (and their 
lobbyists) have already convinced policymakers to devote significant tax revenues 
to other transfer mechanisms, and these on-budget transfers appear to be greater 
than the transfers through the patent system. And if the political costs of 
increasing these on-budget transfers are indeed insurmountable, the advantages of 
patents can be fairly directly replicated through increased regulatory exclusivity 
provisions. 
B. “Abstract Ideas” and Software 
Although the claims at issue in Bilski and Alice were not for software 
inventions per se,124 the “abstract ideas” exception to patentability has significant 
 
120. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT 
ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 31 n.82 (2010), http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/4EXL-HCK4]; see also Heidi L. Williams, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (2013) 
(demonstrating that IP-like restrictions on human genes led to a 20–30% decrease in subsequent 
innovation). 
121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
122. See Lori Pressman, DNA Patent Licensing Under Two Policy Frameworks: Implications for Patient 
Access to Clinical Diagnostic Genomic Tests and Licensing Practice in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 6 LIFE SCI. L. & 
INDUS. REP. 329 (2012). 
123. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 371, and accompanying text. 
124. The claims in Bilski could but did not have to be performed on a computer. See Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 596–99 (2010). In Alice, the patentee argued that “the claims are patent eligible 
because these steps ‘require a substantial and meaningful role for the computer,’” although the patent 
did not claim any particular software algorithm. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2359 (2014). But as noted above, much of the briefing in these cases discussed a broader rule of 
software patent ineligibility. A precise definition of “software” is unimportant for this Article; in 
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implications for software. As discussed in Part I, much of the briefing in these 
cases thus focused on this field. The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice may have 
significantly limited the scope of software patentability; Mark Lemley expects the 
Alice rule “to invalidate the majority of all software patents in force today.”125 
(Alice may also have a significant impact on certain algorithm-based medical 
innovations,126 but this Section focuses on more traditional algorithms.) Because 
this symposium is focused on the effects of Myriad, I review incentives for 
software in less detail. My goal in this Section is simply to illustrate that as in the 
case of biomedical research, many other public innovation incentives are available 
for software R&D, although the optimal mix of incentives will likely differ from 
the biomedical context. 
1. Patent-like Incentives  
There is no equivalent to FDA-administered regulatory exclusivity for 
software. However, nonpatent forms of intellectual property provide ex post, 
market-set financial incentives for software development. In particular, many 
forms of software innovation are rewarded through copyright, trade secrets, and 
trademark protection.127 Trademarks are not typically thought of as innovation 
incentives in the U.S. legal literature, but a growing body of economic scholarship 
emphasizes their role as an appropriation mechanism for innovators, particularly 
in the high-tech sector.128 These other IP incentives may be more effective for 
software than patents, which often take longer to issue than the lifecycle of the 
corresponding software.129 
 
general, I am focusing on new algorithms and computer programs. Cf. Adam Mossoff, A Brief History 
of Software Patents (and Why They’re Valid), 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 65 (2014) (discussing the many 
possible definitions for “software patent”). 
125. Scott Graham, CLS Bank Ruling a Big Deal for Valley Software Patents, RECORDER, June 19, 
2014. 
126. See, e.g., Guy Haskin Fernald et al., Bioinformatics Challenges for Personalized Medicine, 27 
BIOINFORMATICS 1741 (2011); Marc Maegele et al., Predictive Models and Algorithms for the Need of 
Transfusion Including Massive Transfusion in Severely Injured Patients, 39 TRANSFUSION MED. & 
HEMOTHERAPY 85 (2012). 
127. See Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1068 
(2011) (discussing how software vendors use all of these forms of IP protection); Michael Risch, Trade 
Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 152, 153 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg eds., 2011) (“[A] computer software program may be simultaneously protected by 
copyright, patent and trade secret law.”); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software 
Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746 (2011). 
128. See, e.g., Patrick Llerena & Valentine Millot, Are Trade Marks and Patents Complementary or 
Substitute Protections for Innovation (Bureau d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée Working Paper No. 
2013-01, 2013) (finding that trademarks are a substitute for patents in the high-tech business sector). 
See generally Philipp Schautschick & Christine Greenhalgh, Empirical Studies of Trade Marks: The Existing 
Economics Literature (Melbourne Inst. Working Paper No. 25/13, 2013) (reviewing this literature). 
129. See Eric Goldman, The Problems with Software Patents (Part 1 of 3), FORBES (Nov. 28, 2012, 
2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/11/28/the-problems-with-software-
patents/ [http://perma.cc/3ZLA-2SQK]. 
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2. Direct Spending 
Federal and state governments also provide significant support for software 
innovation through direct spending. For each of the past three years, the federal 
government has spent between $3 and $4 billion per year on research grants in 
computer science and mathematics,130 and additional grants are available at the 
state level.131 (In fiscal year 2011, U.S. universities expended an additional $240 
million of institutional funds on computer science R&D.132) Many local 
governments have also directly supported software innovation by investing in 
broadband infrastructure.133 
3. Tax Incentives 
The general federal R&D tax incentives described above, sections 41 and 174 
of the Tax Code, are also available for software research.134 As noted above, these 
provisions together cost about $11 billion per year,135 with the portion going to 
software R&D likely around $500 million to $1 billion.136 The federal government 
also supports the infrastructure necessary for many types of software innovation 
through the broadband sales tax exemption.137 Additional R&D tax incentives are 
available at the state level.138 
4. Prizes 
The federal government has offered numerous prizes for new software. For 
 
130. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., NSF 14-213, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 2011–13, at 53 tbl.19 (2014), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
nsf14312/pdf/nsf14312.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZH35-BDDD]. 
131. NSF statistics on state R&D spending only list field-specific expenditures in agriculture, 
energy, environment, health, and transportation; the total amount of “other” expenditures was $157 
million in fiscal year 2011, a small fraction of which likely supports software-related research. NAT’L 
CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATS., supra note 79, at 17 tbl.8. 
132. Britt, supra note 81, at 2. 
133. See Brian Heaton, Local Governments Pursue Independent Broadband Despite Challenges, 
GOVERNING (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-local-governments-
pursue-independent-broadband.html [http://perma.cc/Q6T7-A6AU]. 
134. See, e.g., Ryan R. Coleman & Trevor Salzmann, Cloud Computing and the Credit for Increasing 
Research Activities, TAX ADVISER ( Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2014/feb/
clinic-story-04.html [http://perma.cc/BS5X-MQZM]. 
135. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
136. Software firms spent $27 billion on R&D in 2011, which was eleven percent of all 
industrial R&D spending, see Wolfe, supra note 85, at 2 tbl.2, and software firms claimed $274 million 
under section 174 in 2005, which was four percent of the total claimed by all industries, see NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., supra note 85, at 227 tbl.4-25. It thus seems plausible that software firms receive roughly 
$500 million to $1 billion of total R&D tax expenditures, or four to nine percent of the total. Eleven 
percent of the $11 billion spent on all R&D tax incentives is $1.2 billion. 
137. Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1100–1104, 112 Stat. 2681-
719, 2681-719 to -28 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)). See generally Austan Goolsbee, 
The Value of Broadband and the Deadweight Loss of Taxing New Technology (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11994, 2006). 
138. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 14, at 325 n.112. 
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example, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) awarded over $3 million for 
better patient scheduling software,139 the Department of Defense awarded $1 
million for an algorithm that identifies organisms from a stream of DNA 
sequences,140 and over 100 completed or ongoing government-prize competitions 
are listed on Challenge.gov.141 Many software-related prizes have also been offered 
by private foundations or industries, ranging from the Clay Mathematics 
Institute’s open $1 million prize for proving whether or not P=NP,142 to the $1 
million prize Netflix awarded for an improved algorithm for predicting how much 
someone will enjoy a movie.143 
The optimal package of innovation incentives for software likely looks very 
different from the biomedical context because of the differences between research 
in the two fields. Software R&D is generally less capital intensive than biomedical 
research. It is also less technologically risky because it is more predictable: 
software is less prone to unexpected failure or unwanted side effects than 
biomedical research. (Though there is still significant commercial risk in new 
software ventures.) Software also moves faster between the initial idea and the 
first sale as a commercialized product: the typical time to market for software 
products is five to fourteen months, compared with twelve to sixteen years for 
pharmaceuticals and one to ten years for in vitro diagnostics.144 
Because the incentive of ex post rewards is unlikely to be significantly dulled 
by capital constraints, risk aversion, or long commercialization times, these 
rewards are likely to be more effective in the software context. Thus, prizes are 
optimal when the government is able to set a clear goal, such as for a specific 
mathematical or algorithmic challenge—and it appears that the government is 
beginning to take advantage of this incentive. 
But the government often fails to recognize the innovations that will have 
the greatest market demand, and market signals are often a good proxy for the 
social value of software, so market-set rewards seem likely to be efficient. One 
might thus expect patents to be very effective in the software field, but in practice 
they are plagued by significant administrative and transaction costs stemming 
 
139. See Help Veterans Make Appointments for VA Outpatient and Ambulatory Care by Creating 
Systems that are Compatible with Open Source VistA and Help to Lead Health IT Transformation, DEVPOST, 
http://vascheduling.devpost.com/ [http://perma.cc/7K4D-QTMG] (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
140. See Press Release, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Research Centre Team 
Members Win US $1 Million Prize in US Department of Defense’s Bioterror Detection Competition 
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://media.ntu.edu.sg/Pages/newsdetail.aspx?news=a445a300-9a52-4b91-bc31-
a9fb6ffcf38a [http://perma.cc/6PWH-3YUG]. 
141. CHALLENGE.GOV, http://challenge.gov/list/?type=SoftwareApps [http://web.archive.
org/web/20150706225540/https://www.challenge.gov/list/?type=SoftwareApps] (last visited July 
6, 2015). 
142. P vs NP Problem, CLAY MATHEMATICS INST., http://www.claymath.org/millennium-
problems/p-vs-np-problem [http://perma.cc/MUV2-Z7HZ] (last updated Nov. 19, 2015). See 
generally Lance Fortnow, The Status of the P Versus NP Problem, 52 COMM. ACM 78 (2009). 
143. Netflix Prize, NETFLIX, http://netflixprize.com [http://perma.cc/WUU9-7SUL] (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
144. See Roin, supra note 111, 719 tbl.1. 
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from the large number of patents per product (contributing to problems such as 
hold-up), delays in examination (such that many products are obsolete by the time 
any corresponding patents are granted), and the existence of many vague or low-
quality patents. 
Other state-sponsored, market-set rewards—including nonpatent IP and 
R&D tax incentives—thus appear to be more effective at promoting software 
innovation. And these nonpatent financial transfers to innovators may be 
sufficient to lead to an efficient amount of research in this field.145  
***** 
Before turning to how these nonpatent incentives might improve the debates 
over patentable subject matter, it is worth noting that patents do more than 
incentivizing invention and commercialization by facilitating transfers from 
consumers to patentees. Patents also encourage the disclosure of technical 
knowledge, which can benefit future innovators and prevent duplicative 
research.146 This disclosure may be ineffective in many software patents,147 and it 
is also unclear how well disclosure works in biotech patenting where physical 
materials and know-how are often critical.148 But to the extent that the 
government wants to encourage disclosure of technical developments, it is worth 
remembering that disclosure is an independent policy lever: any public reward 
could (and perhaps should) be conditioned on some level of disclosure. 
III. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 
More widespread understanding of nonpatent innovation incentives could 
have significant payoffs for patentable-subject-matter debates. Most obviously, it 
would ensure that such debates occur on a sound basis, without misleading 
arguments such as “no patents means no incentives.” But it also might help 
substantively improve these debates. 
First, greater emphasis on nonpatent incentives might ameliorate the 
persistent conflict over contested subject matter areas. This conflict arises in part 
from the disparate motivations of the various participants in these debates. As 
discussed above, the dominant rationale for subject matter exceptions is 
 
145. See Goldman, supra note 129 (arguing that software will be produced without any patent 
incentive because (1) it has significant first-mover advantages, (2) copyrights and trade secrets 
provide adequate incentives, and (3) software vendors can restrict competition without patents). 
146. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 545 (2012). 
147. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
905 (2013) (arguing that many software patents broadly claim functions that they do not disclose). 
148. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical 
Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1, ¶¶ 106–13 (discussing Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic 
Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 
¶ 9 (2006)). But note that some of these problems could be addressed through increased use of 
material depositories. See id. ¶¶ 101–13. 
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utilitarian.149 Yet many parties arguing for robust exceptions are motivated more 
by noneconomic moral concerns.150 For example, amicus parties argued that the 
gene patent claims in Myriad “commodify[ ] human life” and “impinge[ ] on . . . 
rights of privacy,”151 that the diagnostic method claims in Mayo “should be 
invalidated as unconscionable violations of the freedom of thought,”152 and that 
software claims should be invalidated in Bilski because “the freedom to use a 
computer as one sees fit . . . is a fundamental form of expression . . . .”153 
Recognizing a broader range of solutions may help some of these different 
actors find more common ground for consensus. For example, those who are 
morally opposed to granting a property interest in human genes through the 
patent system and those who think genetic research will be undersupplied absent 
significant and predictable transfers to innovators might both be satisfied with an 
expanded package of tax incentives, prizes, grants, or regulatory exclusivity for 
genetic R&D. Of course, such a consensus would require those who are morally 
opposed to gene patents to agree that the private market will not produce 
sufficient R&D absent state incentives, and it would require those who want 
additional public support for innovators to recognize that their goals can be met 
through nonpatent incentives. And this solution would not satisfy all participants 
in these debates, including those who think patents are morally required,154 or 
utilitarians who view patents as strictly superior to nonpatent incentives (despite 
the lack of empirical support for this position155). I do not claim that recognition 
of the full innovation policy toolkit will resolve all conflicts; only that it may help 
some participants in these debates to find common ground. 
In addition to resolving some conflicts between utilitarians and those with 
competing concerns, nonpatent incentives may also be more effective in disputed 
subject matter areas from a purely utilitarian perspective. There are at least three 
distinct reasons why this seems likely to be so. First, the patent incentive is 
strongest when patent law is clear and predictable so that it can guide long-term 
investment decisions, so patents’ effectiveness is certainly reduced by the 
 
149. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. But see ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4–9 (2011) (developing a deontic theory of IP rights, with economic 
efficiency as a “midlevel principle”). 
150. See Chiang, supra note 16, at 1873–85; Jorge L. Contreras, Narratives of Gene Patenting 
( July 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Contreras_Jorge_
IPSC_paper_2014.pdf. 
151. Brief for Canavan Found. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 2107 (2012) (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 5398891, at 
*14. 
152. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst. et al. in Support of Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071914, at *31. 
153. Brief for Free Software Found. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 3199627, at *24. 
154. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual 
Property Theory, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 283 (2012). 
155. However, I do not think this position is supported by existing empirical evidence. See 
Ouellette, supra note 55, at 75–83. 
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profound uncertainty about their long-term availability in contested areas such as 
software or genetic research. While the optimal balance between patents and other 
innovation policies is empirically uncertain, we can at least be confident that 
nonpatent incentives are comparatively more valuable in areas where patents are 
less effective. 
Second, patents are most effective at spurring innovation when most 
researchers actually view them as an incentive. Innovators who share moral 
concerns about patenting—programmers who “believe that software is thought, 
and math, and that no one can own it,”156 or researchers who think that “[p]atents 
on human genes . . . violate ethical tenets”157—naturally find little incentive from 
patents. Since these innovators’ moral concerns with patents seem to focus on the 
propertization of certain kinds of knowledge, they may be more incentivized by 
mechanisms that do not rely on exclusivity as a financing mechanism. Nonpatent 
incentives may thus provide stronger incentives to a broader range of researchers 
in contested areas. 
Third, the patentable-subject-matter debates have arisen in areas in which 
many scholars are concerned that the patent system is failing due to factors like 
high transaction costs or difficulty screening out invalid patents. For example, 
scholars have long been concerned about the potential negative effects of property 
rights on “upstream” scientific discoveries such as DNA.158 And leading 
academics gathered in 2012 at a conference devoted to “Solutions to the Software 
Patent Problem.”159 Despite these concerns, some scholars have argued that 
patents on software or upstream innovations should not be barred because there 
is valuable, nonobvious work to be done in these areas, so at least some patents will 
be beneficial.160 However, it may make more sense to use patentable subject 
matter as a coarse filter in these areas,161 and to use nonpatent incentives to 
reward the valuable inventions that fall through this filter. 
To be clear, I am not necessarily arguing for more field-specific tailoring of 
substantive patent law based on economic balancing.162 For those who think that 
 
156. Michael Risch, Two Worlds of Software Patents, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:28 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/11/two-worlds-of-software-patents.html [http://
perma.cc/M6SK-V2AA]. 
157. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Med. Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 390998, 
at *4. 
158. See Ouellette, supra note 148 (reviewing this literature). 
159. See Solutions to the Software Patent Problem, SANTA CLARA L., http://law.scu.edu/hightech/
2012-solutions-to-the-software-patent-problem/ [http://perma.cc/3BPW-WE6P] (last visited Nov. 
15, 2015). 
160. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949 
(2015); Risch, supra note 156. 
161. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 
1066 (2011) (developing a simple model to illustrate how such a coarse filter can be welfare 
enhancing, assuming that the PTO makes mistakes in its more particularized determinations). 
162. On the prevalence of industry-specific tailoring in patent law, see Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 42. 
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patentable-subject-matter doctrine should be based on judicial balancing of 
incentives for each type of invention, the prevalence of nonpatent incentives 
implies that courts must look beyond patents. Under this approach, the 
boundaries of patentable subject matter would necessarily change over time as 
Congress supplies or removes alternative incentives. But there is little reason to 
think that courts are particularly good at this kind of comprehensive economic 
analysis.163 Of course, courts might be the least bad option: the PTO and other 
innovation-focused agencies lack coordination,164 and Congress has been 
politically deadlocked. A full comparative institutional analysis is beyond the scope 
of this Article; my point is simply that judicial balancing of economic incentives is 
not the only approach. 
Rather than dictating to courts how they should decide patentable-subject-
matter cases, my argument is simply that courts should not allow concerns about 
eliminating innovation incentives to trump other concerns. Courts can focus on 
whatever analytical tools seem most appropriate, including textual analysis, 
historical exclusions for “nature,” moral concerns about propertizing certain kinds 
of information, or the need for stable and predictable doctrine. The latter seems 
particularly important in patent law, where rules are supposed to be guiding 
investment decisions made on multidecade timescales. Greater recognition of 
nonpatent incentives may prevent courts from worrying so much that a clear and 
predictable subject matter rule will allow many valuable inventions to fall through 
the cracks—those inventions can be caught by the safety net of other public 
incentives, and policymakers can step in to tailor innovation policy around 
whatever bright lines the courts set up. Recognition that insufficient patent 
incentives can be supplemented with other transfer mechanisms may give courts 
more confidence in drawing clearer patentable-subject-matter boundaries, 
improving this doctrinal morass. 
 
163. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33–40 (2008). 
164. See generally id. (proposing such an agency). However, the PTO now has an Office of the 
Chief Economist, which was created in March 2010 with research goals including “[u]ncovering how 
IP relates to economic growth, performance and employment.” Press Release, U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, USPTO Chief Economist Unveils Agency’s New Economic Research Agenda 
During Conference on Intellectual Property and the Innovation Economy (Dec. 9, 2010), http://
www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-chief-economist-unveils-agencys-new-economic-
research-agenda-during [http://perma.cc/KN49-3FMC]. Many other agencies also affect patent 
policy. See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205 (2015). During rulemaking, “[e]ach agency shall 
also seek to identify, as appropriate, means to achieve regulatory goals that are designed to promote 
innovation.” Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 ( Jan. 18, 2011). It thus seems plausible that 
the dialog among these agencies could lead to better innovation policy than courts deciding particular 
patent cases. See generally Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for 
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1242 (2012) (discussing the value of “[s]ystematic interagency 
debate” in setting innovation policy). 
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CONCLUSION 
Although most commentators agree that the primary justification for the 
patent laws is economic utilitarianism, this does not mean that every patent 
doctrine is best approached from a utilitarian perspective. There are likely many 
welfare-enhancing inventions relating to genes and algorithms for which the 
expected cost to the innovator is greater than the private benefit that can be 
appropriated without state intervention, so state-facilitated transfers that help 
close this gap are socially valuable. And yet there may be good reasons—including 
noneconomic ones—to limit the extent to which patent law is the primary policy 
tool for closing this gap. It may thus make more sense to define these patentable-
subject-matter exclusions in ways that are relatively easy to apply, and to leave the 
utilitarian tailoring to other innovation policies. 
But my key point is simply that whatever courts do with patentable-subject-
matter doctrine, they should not do it with patent blinders. The state provides 
financial transfers to innovators through a vast array of nonpatent incentives, and 
it could provide more. Ignoring these nonpatent incentives in patentable-subject-
matter debates is a mistake. 
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